the Court declared that "the fundamental principle of representative government in this country is one of equal representation for equal numbers of people, without regard to race, sex, economic status, or place of residence within a State." ' The Court also found the right to vote to be "a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society" as a "preservative of other basic civil and political rights," ' further ensuring that all qualified persons would be able to exercise the franchise equally in a "free and unimpaired manner." ' The ostensible impact of these bold declarations was to raise the "democratic ideals of equality and majority rule" to the status of constitutional requirements. 9 A quarter-century later, this Comment will argue that the Court once again may be forced to intervene, absent imminent reform by Congress and state legislatures, in the realm of electoral participation, this time to remedy the gross inequities that characterize the system of personal registration in the United States.
In the 1988 general election, only 50.16% of eligible voters cast a ballot, the lowest voter turnout rate since 1924.10 The turnout rate is even lower in off-year elections." 1 As these figures attest, there has been a precipitous decline in voter turnout in the United States since 1960.12 Election scholars have proposed a myriad of possible reasons for the decline in participation. Some critics attribute the decline to institutional causes, such as the decline of party competition." Others look to
The vast majority 2 " of states continue to maintain registration deadlines of up to fifty days before an election, 22 and authorize restrictive registration practices such as inconvenient registration sites and hours. 2 " These practices have led many commentators and scholars to acknowledge that the requirement of personal registration in the United States is at least one cause of low voter turnout. 24 Critical legal analyses of the registration system in the United States have demonstrated that contemporary registration laws could be subject to successful equal protection and statutory challenges. 2 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988 . 22 State registration deadlines range from five days in Utah, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-2-6 (Supp. 1988) , to the fifty day registration deadline in Arizona. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-120 (West Supp. 1988) .
23 For a description of restrictive registration practices as well as their effects, see infra notes 78-100 and accompanying text. 24 See, e.g., A. CAMPBELL, supra note 14, at 281-82 (noting correlation between "restrictive" election laws and variability in voter turnout); K. PHILLIPS & P.
BLACKMAN, ELECTORAL REFORM AND VOTER PARTICIPATION 52-53 (1975) (though disputing that federal registration reform would be a panacea for low voter turnout, estimating that federally assisted national registration would increase turnout by 5-10%); F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, supra note 18, at 17-18 (maintaining that voter registration procedures are the "linchpin" of the distorted rates of voter turnout); R. WOLFINGER & S. ROSENSTONE, supra note 14, at 73 (projecting that reform of registration laws would increase national voter turnout by 9.1%); Burnham, The Turnout Problem, in ELECTIONS AMERICAN STYLE 108 (A.J. Reichley ed. 1987) ("[F] irst-rate empirical work has demonstrated that personal registration systematically reduces turnout."); Glass, Squire & Wolfinger, Voter Turnout: An International Comparison, 6 PUB. OPINION 49, 52-53 (Dec./Jan. 1984 ) (finding lower rates of voter turnout in the United States than in Europe explained most easily by tougher registration procedures); Guinier, Keeping the Faith: Black Voters in the Post-Reagan Era, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 418 (1989) (stating that registration requirements "primarily serve to reduce voter participation among all citizens, especially minorities"); Kelley, Ayres & Bowen, supra note 17, at 362 (" [R] egistration requirements are a more effective deterrent to voting than anything that normally operates to deter citizens from voting once they have registered, at least in presidential elections.").
2 See, e.g., Note, Eradicating Racial Discrimination in Voter Registration: Rights and Remedies Under the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, 52 FORD-HAM L. REV. 93, 109-22 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Eradicating Racial Discrimination] (arguing that the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act create an affirmative duty upon the states to excise election procedures, such as certain aspects of voter registration, that perpetuate the effects of past racial discrimination); Comment, Access to Voter Registration, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 482, 494-518 (1974) (detailing possible equal protection, due process, and fifteenth amendment challenges to registration laws that burden the exercise of the franchise, especially as to minorities); Note, Voter Registration: A Restriction on the Fundamental Right to Vote, 96 YALE L.J. 1615 , 1617 -40 (1987 [hereinafter Note, Voter Registration] (arguing that registration laws are vulnerable under the fundamental rights strand of equal protection in that they do not serve a "compelling state interest" nor employ the "least restrictive means").
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Comment goes one step further, arguing that the Court soon will be forced to take affirmative action to rectify the infirmities that characterize the system of personal registration in the United States, similar to the affirmative action taken by the Court in the early 1960s when confronted with gross malapportionment. Part I traces the history of registration laws in the United States to the present day, demonstrating that such laws have had an inherent and continuing disenfranchising effect. Part II notes that when confronted with another significant problem in the electoral realm, that of gross malapportionment, the Court intervened to forge the principle of one person, one vote. It then identifies two "critical features" of malapportionment that compelled judicial intervention: the rapid increase in inequality among districts over time, and legislative self-interest in resisting districting reform. Part III demonstrates that these two "critical features" similarly are present in the realm of voter registration. First, it notes that the rate of unregistered Americans is downwardly spiralling over time, and will soon reach crisis proportions, if it has not done so already. Second, it argues that Congress and state legislatures have a self-interest in rejecting registration reform, as legislators are loathe to redefine the electorate that voted them into office. Part IV concludes by arguing that due to the unremedied presence of these "critical features," the Court soon will be forced to intervene in the realm of voter registration. First, it reviews the constitutional arguments that could serve as the underlying bases to judicial intervention. Second, it argues that the Court must remedy the infirmities of the present system of voter registration by requiring uniform voter enrollment by the government at regular intervals, thereby transferring the burden of registration from the individual to the state.
I. HISTORY AND EFFECTS OF REGISTRATION LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES
Registration laws in the United States historically have denied qualified voters equal access to the ballot. This Comment divides an analysis of those laws into two parts. Part A traces the history and disenfranchising nature of registration laws in the United States. Part B analyzes registration laws currently in force, concluding that despite reforms, such laws continue to inhibit many qualified voters from the ballot.
A. History of Registration Laws in the United States
Most laws requiring the personal registration of voters in the United States have been in existence only since the late nineteenth cen-tury. 2 " Prior to 1860, only a few New England states 27 and certain cities" required any form of registration. 29 It was only as urbanization increased geometrically during the mid-nineteenth century" 0 that registration laws aimed at preventing voter fraud were passed in many northern states, often with the law being applicable only to large cities. 3 a Most of these early laws, however, did not require personal registration, and thus were ineffective at curbing voter fraud. 2 At the end of the nineteenth century, most states either introduced or strengthened existing voter registration laws. 3 A key feature of these new statutes was the requirement of personal registration, which "shifted the burden of establishing eligibility from the state to the indi- 1912-1924, at 105 (1976) 
1972). i
This is not to suggest, of course, that there existed universal suffrage before registration laws were enacted. States had always possessed the power to proscribe voter qualifications, which "typically concerned sex, age, place of residency, duration of residency, property, wealth, freeman status, and race." Comment, supra note 25, at 485. Blacks were totally disenfranchised before the Civil War in all but six northeastern states, see Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523, 525 (1973) , and were only guaranteed suffrage with the passage of the fifteenth amendment in 1870. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV. Women were denied the franchise until the passage of the nineteenth amendment in 1920. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
30 See, e.g See, e.g., id . at 65-66 (noting that "early registration laws were ineffective against corrupt and powerful political machines"); Converse, supra note 29, at 283 (finding that absent personal registration, "ward heelers" drew up registration lists, so fraud was not cured). 1 22 See J. HARRIS, supra note 27, at 65; Converse, supra note 29, at 283-84. 34 P. KLEPPNER, supra note 12, at 60, A related revision was the change from [Vol. 137:2361 tion laws was to increase protection against vote corruption, 5 an illicit goal was disenfranchisement, directed against blacks in the South and new immigrants from southern and eastern Europe in the North and Midwest. 36 As one prescient commentator has noted, "[tihere are certain broad themes which link the origins of all such [registration] legislation together. To a very great degree, it was motivated by racism ")37
The new registration laws had a marked effect on voter turnout rates throughout the nation. 8 In the South, most blacks and many poor permanent registration to either periodic or annual registration. See F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, supra note 18, at 90.
11 See, e.g ., J. HARRIS, supra note 27, at 72 ("The extension of registration was to come after the rapid growth of cities following the Civil War, the great influx of immigrants, and the growth of cities following the Civil War, the growth in power and corruption of the political machines . . ... "); P. KLEPPNER, supra note 12, at 58 (finding registration reform to be part of "a concerted and successful effort to rationalize and regulate the conduct of elections and the role of political parties in the electoral process").
A few commentators claim that progressive reform was the primary intent of the new registration laws. See, e.g., Converse, supra note 29, at 286 ("[T] he idealistic forces of reform, bent on cleaning up the fraud continuing to haunt voting process in the United States, lent their weight to the demands of the cities for broader registration control."); Rusk, Comment: The American Electoral Universe: Speculation and Evidence, 68 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1028 REV. , 1045 REV. (1974 (arguing that the intended effect of the new registration system was "to end vote corruption"). However, the strength of this argument depends upon the actual prevalence of widespread vote fraud, a question that is the focus of much scholarly debate. Compare Converse, supra note 29, at 282 (noting a widespread recognition of voter fraud in this period) and Rusk, supra, at 1032-33 (finding the existence of weak registration laws and the unofficial ballot, both integral to vote corruption, to be expressly implemented by the political parties to control the vote) with P. KLEPPNER, supra note 12, at 59 (arguing that voter fraud was episodic rather than routine) and Burnham, supra note 17, at 126 (rejecting as "unprovable" and "unreasonable" the notion of "universal corruption" of the voting process Even commentators who profess that reform was the primary goal of the new registration laws recognize that there also existed a disenfranchising intent in these enactments. See, e.g., Converse, supra note 29, at 297 (stating that registration laws were viewed as a means "to protect the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture from further subversion by the hordes of new immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. While 'morality' made a much finer platform than 'our culture is better than yours,' the nativist implications of the reforms were widely perceived").
" Burnham, supra note 36, at 336. Though some scholars argue that other forces were the primary cause of the 2367 whites were eliminated from voter rolls. 39 Since the fifteenth amendment prohibited the overt disenfranchisement of blacks, 40 the South utilized more sophisticated and oblique schemes. 4 ' In addition to personal registration, southern states instituted an "interlocking network of legal devices," ' 4 2 including literacy tests, poll taxes, eight-box laws, and the secret or "Australian ballot," to achieve disenfranchisement. 43 Despite the wide-spread use of these more sophisticated schemes, however, the arbitrary administration of the registration system remained the primary mode of disenfranchisement. 4 4 As one commentator has noted, "[tlhe key disfranchising features of the southern registration laws were the amount of discretion granted to the registrars, the specificity of the information required of the registrant, the times and places set for registration, and the requirement that a voter bring his registration certificate to the polling place." ' 4 5 The effect of personal registration had a similar effect in the North and the Midwest. 46 Registration statutes passed in these areas turnout decline at the end of the twentieth century, they nevertheless recognize the disenfranchising effects of registration laws. '" See, e.g., J. HARRIS, supra note 27, at 157 ("The Negro in the South has been disfranchised largely through the arbitrary administration of registration rather than by the literacy requirement and other suffrage qualifications.").
were directed primarily against the populations of urban areas, indicating a strong distrust of city political "'machines' and their ethnic clienteles." ' 47 As time went on, however, the laws were extended to smaller cities and even some rural areas. 4 These registration procedures were "exceedingly expensive, cumbersome, and inconvenient, ' 4 9 and many citizens who were only marginally involved in the voting process were "priced out of the system" as the costs of participation had become too great. 50 The Supreme Court was not immediately receptive to constitutional challenges to state registration laws. Indeed, the Court upheld almost every statute with a disenfranchising effect for a period extending half a century. 5 " At the turn of the century, the Court rejected five challenges to various state registration schemes, basing each decision on procedural grounds. 52 The Court also upheld as constitutional many restrictive election laws, including the poll tax, 5 3 the literacy test, 54 and white primaries that were not mandated by the state. 55 Gradually, however, the Court began to invalidate the more egregious election laws. As early as 1915, the Court struck down the use of the grandfather clause, which had served to protect whites from being 68 Am. Pot.. Sci. REV. 1050 REV. , 1057 REV. (1974 ; see also Burnham, supra note 36, at 336 (finding southern election schemes to be "paralleled in a less extreme form" in the North).
4 Burnham, supra note 36, at 336-37. 193 U.S. 146, 165-66 (1904) (denying review to an Alabama Supreme Court decision that rejected a challenge to Alabama registration laws and practices); Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 213-15, 225 (1898) (denying appeal of a criminal conviction by an all-white jury by plaintiff who charged that blacks had been intentionally excluded from jury duty by means of their intentional exclusion from voter rolls); Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 657-58 (1895) (finding challenge to South Carolina registration laws to be moot, as the election in which the plaintiffs wished to vote had already taken place); see also Derfner, supra note 29, at 539-41 (providing case backgrounds disenfranchised by the literacy test. 5 The Court also began to chip away at the "most effective and simplest way of disfranchising blacks"-the white primary. 5 7 In 1927, the Court invalidated white primaries ordered by the state; 58 then, in 1944, the Court outlawed the white primary completely. 5 " Black registration in the South subsequently increased at a moderate rate throughout the early 1950s. 6 0 With the downfall of the white primary, most southern states returned to the use of discretionary registration systems as the primary means of discrimination. In "giving substantial discretion to the local white registrar, who was . . . 'a law unto himself in determining the citizen's possession of literacy, understanding, and other qualifications,' legislators could restrict black registration with a minimum of effort."" 1 Other states turned to different means: Alabama adopted a state constitutional amendment, known as the Boswell Amendment, which mandated literacy and good character tests, among others, 62 Mississippi enacted a double literacy and understanding test," 3 and Louisiana implemented an organized effort to purge black voters from voter rolls on the basis of technical registration infractions. 64 As a result of these restrictive measures, progress in black registration in the late 1950s was "limited at best." 5 The major advances in breaking down the barriers to the ballot finally were forged in the 1960s. Through the sustained success of the Civil Rights Movement, the Civil Rights Act of 1964"6 and, more im-58 See Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347, 357-68 (1915 6" See id. The Boswell Amendment was subsequently ruled unconstitutional by a three-judge district court panel, who found the Amendment to be designed to achieve the goal of granting to local registrars the opportunity to discriminate, which they were in fact doing. § 1971 (1982) ). For a discussion of the aims and effects of the Civil Rights Act, see Derfner, supra note 29, at 547-50.
[Vol. 137:2361 portantly, the Voting Rights Act of 196567 were enacted. Due in large part to the effects of these affirmative congressional mandates, states have substantially relaxed voter registration requirements since 1960.8 And when the Supreme Court declared the right to vote to be fundamental in Reynolds v. Sims, 6 9 it opened the door for the invalidation of many of the more blatant disenfranchisement techniques. The Court would ultimately strike down both the poll tax 70 and durational residency requirements, 7 1 and also would uphold congressional power to proscribe literacy tests. The abolition of such devices as the poll tax and the literacy test, however, has not resulted in a substantial and sustained rise in registration rates; other impediments to the ballot have remained 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § § 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1982) ). It is far beyond the scope of this Comment even to attempt an analysis of the dramatic impact that the Voting Rights Act has had in the last twenty-four years. Instead, the words of one voting rights commentator will have to suffice:
The Act was an immediate success. The effects on voters, and registrars, of suspending literacy tests and of installing federal examiners to register voters in problem areas was electric. By 1967, the percentage of blacks registered in the covered states has risen sharply, and has continued to rise to the point where black registration is not far below white registration in many parts of the South.
Derfner, supra note 29, at 552.
The fact that the Voting Rights Act was introduced in part as a response to violent attacks by southern authorities on blacks and whites marching to secure voting rights for all citizens, see A. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVF ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 2 (1987), is a testament to the courage and tenacity of all those involved in the Civil Rights Movement. 301, 334 (1966) , the Court upheld a Voting Rights Act ban of literacy tests and similar devices for a period of five years in areas of demonstrated past discrimination via Congress's fifteenth amendment enforcement power. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652-53 (1966) , the Court upheld a similar Voting Rights Act provision that served to outlaw New York's requirement of literacy in English as a prerequisite to voting as it applied to Puerto Ricans with certain education qualifications via Congress's fourteenth amendment enforcement power. Finally, in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 131-34 (1970) , the Court upheld the constitutionality of a provision of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 which banned the use of literacy tests in any state as a prerequisite to voting.
In upholding congressional power to proscribe literacy tests in these rulings, the Court did not address their constitutional viability, thus distinguishing and not overruling Lassiter v. Northampton Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959) , which had found literacy tests to be constitutional. Sess. 369 (1975) .
78 As noted supra note 22, Arizona maintains a fifty-day registration deadline. [Vol. 137:2361 too late to register. 7 9 Compounding this problem is the fact that registration is often limited to a single central location in a county-often the county courthouse 8°-during working hours. 8 ' Another impediment to the franchise is the fact that whenever one moves, "whether it is down the street, to a nearby town, or across the country, it is necessary to register anew." 82 This requirement causes a marked downturn in participation for mobile Americans who have moved within the past two years. 8 3 Furthermore, it serves as a linchpin for abusive and partisan election practices aimed at excluding from the polls those voters who have moved within the jurisdiction and unwittingly failed to reregister.
84
Dual registration, the technique of requiring citizens to register in two different jurisdictions (typically a county and a municipality) also impedes registration. 5 1o For many blacks in the South, the courthouse building is a "psychological barrier, for it stands as a symbol of the historic oppression of black people." REPORT:
AFTER THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, supra note 79, at 5. This fact is evidenced by the testimonial of one southern voting rights activist: "I knew blacks and some whites, when you say courthouse, they freeze up, they been scared off." Hand & Douglas, Enough is Enough: Voting Rights Denied, 9 S. EXPOSURE 95, 95 (1981) (interview with Geraldine Sawyer, mayor of a small, unincorporated southern residential community).
1 See REPORT: AFTER THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, supra note 79, at 2-3. One investigative study of registration practices in several states found that more than onehalf of the 300 registration offices investigated were not clearly identified, one-quarter did not have convenient parking facilities, and more than one-half were not easily accessible by public transportation. dual registration," 6 while several other states leave local officials discretion to invoke this requirement. 8 7 Forty states and the District of Columbia also utilize "purge statutes" which, though necessary in some form to ensure the integrity of the voting rolls, often remove previously registered citizens who have already met the burden of registration but who have failed to exercise the franchise within a given time period.
8
This confusing maze of registration laws requires a qualified voter to ascertain (at a minimum) where and when to obtain the registration form, how to fill it in, whether supporting documents are needed, what the deadline is, and whether a declaration of party affiliation is required. For even a motivated citizen, these requirements present administrative obstacles that are hard to overcome. Finally, similar to the situation existent when registration laws were first enacted, the discretionary power granted to local registrars often serves to impede registration rather than further it. 90 Many states allow local registrars full discretion to establish satellite sites 91 89 Stone, supra note 18, at 522. 90 As noted supra note 44 and accompanying text, the key disenfranchising features of many registration laws at the turn of the century were the discretionary power of the registrar and inconvenient times and places for registration, among others.
11 See, e.g (1972) ; see P. KIM-BALL, supra note 18, at 297 ("The staffing of registration points is usually under the control of local organizations who sometimes have special interest in excluding potential new voters who might threaten the distribution of power."); Guinier, supra note 24, at 418 (noting that "many local officials treat the franchise as a privilege which the voter must earn").
The United States Commission on Civil Rights has reported that "minority organizations and private citizens who have attempted to secure more flexible registration procedures reported lack of cooperation or hostility on the part of registration officials." UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: UNFUL-FILLED GOALS 67 (1981) . In terms of specific practices of local registrars that serve to retard voter registration, the League of Women Voters Education Fund study found that:
Only eleven percent of the local officials . . . published a voter information guide; 28 percent provided no training for poll workers; and in approximately thirty percent of the registration places where bilingual assistance was needed, local officials failed to provide that service. Election officials clearly have the power to make registration and voting procedures easier for citizens . . . by and large, they don't use it. the types of demands it will make on them. 9 Simply put, in the United States, "registration is often more difficult than voting." 1 00
An analysis of the effects of the system of personal registration on voters is enhanced by a comparison of participatory rates in the United States with those of other western democratic nations. The United States consistently ranks at the bottom of cross-section analyses of voter turnout rates."' 1 Seventeen of twenty-four western nations studied, on the other hand, had participatory rates that exceeded 75%.'02
The most apparent reason for this differential is the fact that in other western democracies, voting is a collective responsibility in which both the government and the individual citizen are involved in ensuring universal participation in the political process. 10 3 Voter registration in these nations is either automatic, activated by citizen identity cards and/or governmental records, or is initiated by governmental canvasses of the electorate. 10 4 Six nations in fact impose penalties upon nonvoters.
10 5 The United States is the only western nation that continues to follow the "obsolete" English practice of placing the entire burden of registration upon the individual. 1 0 6 99 Id. 10 Rosenstone & Wolfinger, supra note 18, at 22. In the 1988 general election, 37% of nonvoters stated that they did not vote because they were not registered, by far the most important reason given for nonvoting . See If Nonvoters Had Voted: Same Winner, But Bigger, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21. 1988, at B16, col. 3 ; see also Crotty, supra note 11, at 84 ("By far, the reason given by the greatest number in explaining their nonvoting was registration. Taking the population of nonvoters as a whole, 82 percent said the reason that they did not vote was that they were not registered.").
101 See, e.g 20 (1986) .
10. See Crotty, supra note 11, at 69; Rose, supra note 79, at 179; Squire, Wolfinger & Glass, supra note 11, at 45. In Australia and New Zealand, citizens must take the initiative to register, but they are legally required to do so and subject to fines or other penalties for failing to do so. See Powell, supra note 105, at 21. Similarly in France registration is ostensibly left to the voluntary initiative of citizens; however, they are legally required to register in their community and to obtain identification cards, which facilitates registration. See id.
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A common argument that attempts to explain the disparity in participatory rates between the United States and other western democracies holds that it is the result of higher levels of voter alienation and apathy in the United States. Studies consistently have demonstrated, however, that Americans' confidence and pride in their own governmental structure is unparalleled among western nations. 107 The sense of civic virtue evidenced by American citizens is not limited solely to registered voters. Studies show no difference between voters and nonvoters in terms of their views of a civic duty to vote, or in views that ordinary citizens have a say in what the government does. 08 The more likely explanation for the disparity in participation rates between the United States and other western nations is the presence of registration restrictions. In the United States, voter turnout is calculated as the percentage of the voting-age population that casts a ballot on election day. When voting rates are calculated based upon the percentage of registered citizens who voted, however, the rate of participation in the United States is comparable to those of other western nations, ranging between 85-89%.09
II. ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE: JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN THE

REALM OF REDISTRICTING
In the early 1960s, the Supreme Court was faced with a similarly monumental problem in the electoral realm that threatened the viability of representative government-the existence of gross malapportionment that had become "alarmingly large and senselessly erratic" throughout the United States. 
1989]
tervention in the "political thicket" in order to remedy malapportionment. Part A reviews the advent of one person, one vote from Baker v. Carr... through Reynolds v. Sims." 2 It then discusses the qualitative dimensions of the rule as applied in federal and state districting schemes. Part B identifies two "critical features" of malapportionment that compelled judicial intervention. First, it describes the rapidly worsening condition of malapportionment over time. Second, it notes that legislative reform was not forthcoming in that legislators had a selfinterest in retaining, rather than reforming, districting schemes.
A. The Rule of One Person, One Vote
Advent of One Person, One Vote
In 1962, after sixteen years of resisting equal protection challenges to districting laws,"' the Supreme Court intervened in the realm of redistricting in Baker, reflecting a realization of "the manifest need to rectify gross malapportionment."" ' 4 Justice Brennan found that redistricting presented a justiciable question, stating that "U]udicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar, and it has been open to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine . . . that a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action." ' 5 The Court subsequently gave meaning to Baker a year later, holding in Gray v. Sanders" 6 that a statewide primary system that afforded greater weight to ballots cast in rural areas than to those cast in urban areas 3 The Supreme Court first rejected an equal protection challenge to a state's districting plan in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549 (1946) . In Colegrove, the Court found that the districting issue was "of a purely political nature and therefore not meet for judicial determination." Id. at 552. Subsequently the Court summarily refused to consider a number of other redistricting cases based upon the Colegrove rationale. See Carpeneti, Legislative Apportionment. Multimember Districts and Fair Representation, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 666, 666 n.1 (1972) (analyzing pre-Baker redistricting litigation); Comment, supra note 3, at 191 n.46 (same).
In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), however, a unanimous Court found that an Alabama act changing the boundaries of the City of Tuskegee from a square to an "uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure," id. at 340, was violative of the fifteenth amendment if its effect was to deprive blacks of their right to vote. 125 See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568. The Reynolds Court rejected any analogy between state legislative districting schemes and the federal legislative structure, stating that "in establishing our type of federalism a group of formerly independent States bound themselves together under one national government. . . .Political subdivisions of States-counties, cities, or whatever-never were and never have been considered as sovereign entities." Id. at 574-75. In two companion cases to Reynolds, the Court specifically invalidated state legislative schemes modeled after the federal system. See Lucas, 377 U.S. at Maryland Comm. 130 See id. at 529 n.1. The largest deviation from the ideal was 3.13%, while the ratio of the largest to the smallest district was 1.06 to 1.
[Vol. 137:2361 absolute equality, or for which justification is shown," ' 3 ' effectively withdrew the de minimis standard endorsed only two years earlier in Swann." 32 In no case was this more evident than in Karcher v. Daggett, 3 ' where the Court invalidated a New Jersey congressional redistricting plan that varied only 0.6984% from mathematical equality. ' The Court was less stringent in the realm of state legislative redistricting. In Mahan v. Howell, 135 the Court concluded that the standard of mathematical equality required by the equal protection clause was less stringent than the standard required for congressional redistricting under article I, section 2.13' The Court held that de minimis deviations from population equality can be justified by legitimate state policies applied in a consistent and nondiscriminatory fashion.' 3 Since Mahan, the Court has continued to apply this more lenient standard in state legislative redistricting cases." 3 8
B. "Critical Features" of Malapportionment Leading to Judicial Intervention
One commentator has noted that the redistricting cases involved rights that were essential to the democratic process, and whose dimensions could not safely be left to elected representatives, who had a vested interest in the status quo.' 39 This Comment argues much the same principles, setting out two "critical features" in the districting realm that compelled judicial intervention. See, e.g., Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 848-49 (1983) (O'Connor, concurring) (upholding a Wyoming state legislative redistricting plan with a population variance of 89% between the largest and smallest districts, on the grounds that Wyoming's "longstanding policy of preserving county boundaries" was legitimate); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 737, 740-41 (1973) (upholding a Connecticut state legislative districting plan with deviations between districts of up to 7.83%, finding them not sufficient to support a prima facie case of invidious discrimination). But see Board of Estimate v. Morris, 109 S. Ct. 1433 Ct. , 1438 Ct. -43 (1989 (holding a deviation of 78% among the New York City Board of Estimates to be inconsistent with the rule of one person, one vote).
139 See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 117 (1980).
Increasing Scope of Malapportionment
Malapportionment in the United States, at both the congressional and state district levels, grew increasingly severe during the early 1960s. The 1950s had witnessed enormous shifts of population both within and among the states: sixteen states lost between one and three seats in Congress, while nine others gained up to eight seats. 14° Although states that redistricted after the 1960 census more closely approximated population equality, those that did not manifested substantial inequalities in district populations and exhibited distinct urbanrural patterns. 41 These factors contributed to a considerable overall dilution of metropolitan strength in most states and in the House of Representatives as a whole. 42 At the state level, both restrictive constitutional provisions conditioning representation of counties or other subunits on factors other than population and legislative failure to redistrict ensured that urban and suburban areas similarly were grossly underrepresented. 1 4 3 Only six states were districted so that a minimum of forty percent of the state's population was needed to elect a majority in each house of the legislature, while in thirteen states, one-third or less of the population could elect majorities in both houses. 1 44 Thus, over the course of the twentieth century, increasing population growth and the constant fluidity of the population's composition and location greatly exacerbated district malapportionment.
1 45 An important consideration that underlay the Court's arrival at the principle of one person, one vote was the fact that it was the only judicially manageable standard capable of resolving the increasingly se-140 See G. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLuTIoN 72-73 & Table 7 (1966). 141 See id. at 78 (describing the urban-rural pattern as the universal presence within a state of overpopulated typically urban or suburban districts and underpopulated typically rural or small-town districts). 142 See id. Even states that had redistricted after the 1960 census often experienced dilution of metropolitan voting strength. For example, Arizona's First Congressional District, which encompassed the City of Phoenix, contained a population of 663,510, while the rural Third Congressional District had only 198,236 inhabitants. See id. at 73 (Table 7) . 141 146 See Auerbach, supra note 9, at 68.
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vere malapportionment problem. The bold action of mandating one person, one vote was, as one commentator noted, "an effort by the Court to solve a national problem which was assuming crisis proportions . . ."146 The scheme of decennial redistricting urged by the Court in Reynolds was geared specifically at combining the requirement of mathematical equality with an automatic adjustment process, thus facilitating the goal of equal legislative representation notwithstanding the growth and fluidity of the nation's population. 47 While not declaring decennial redistricting to be a constitutional requisite, the Reynolds Court urged that "compliance with such an approach would clearly meet the minimal requirements for maintaining a reasonably current scheme of legislative representation," and warned that "if reapportionment were accomplished with less frequency, it would assuredly be constitutionally suspect."' 4 8
Legislative Self-Interest in Resisting Districting Reform
Political realities in the United States also frustrated malapportionment reform. In Baker, the Court noted that in the more than sixty years since the 1901 adoption of a previous districting scheme, all proposals for redistricting in both Houses of the General Assembly had failed. 4 9 In simple terms, " [s] tate legislators who completely understood the growing disparities in population representation were also those who had the most to gain from not calling attention to the fact."' 5 0 Legislators at both the federal and state levels had derived their power from existing districting schemes and thus were loathe to threaten their political viability by tampering with the status quo.' 5 ' Political realities only perpetuated the malapportionment in the nation.
The Court's action in formulating the one person, one vote rule thus nullified the problem of the political intransigence that so characterized state legislative action in the redistricting context. As one com- See, e.g ., J. ELY, supra note 139, at 121 (stating that legislators had a selfinterest in "maintaining whatever apportionment . . . that got and keeps them where they are); R. McKAY, supra note 110, at 38 (noting that due to legislative self-interest in retaining the status quo, "the resulting conspiracy of silence was understandable"); L. TRIBE, supra note 114, at § 13-3, 1064 n.9 (criticizing Justice Harlan's dissent in Wesberry for not addressing the probability that "legislators who had achieved their positions through malapportionment would be unlikely to remedy such electoral schemes").
mentator has noted:
[T]he essence of our constitutionalism [is] that 'all forms of organized power over men's wills should in some way be accountable to serve ends of broader concern than the purposes of power holders.' It is this constitutional ideal that is being violated by self-interested legislators when they refuse to reapportion equitably. Only the Court could vindicate it. 152 Absent action by the Court, the political realities that impeded districting reform would have continued to pervade the constitutional system.
III. THE PRESENCE OF "CRITICAL FEATURES" IN THE REALM OF
VOTER REGISTRATION
This Comment has argued that the "critical features" in the electoral realm of a rapid and worsening condition over time and legislative self-interest in resisting reform compelled the Supreme Court to intervene in the "political thicket" of redistricting. Part III of this Comment demonstrates that these "critical features" similarly are present in the realm of voter registration. Part A demonstrates that registration is on a rapid, downward spiral in the United States. It then notes that poor, young, and minority citizens suffer most from these voting restrictions. Part B argues that legislative resistance to the reform of voter registration laws is rooted in the fear of redefining the contours of the electorate from which they were voted into office.
A. The Downward Spiral of Voter Registration
The presence of registration laws in the United States clearly presents significant barriers to the exercise of the franchise for many citizens. A more stark reality, however, is that the rate of registration in the United States is entrenched in a continuous downward spiral. And as voter registration drives generally have proved ineffectual at curbing the nonregistration spiral, 15 these figures only show signs of mushrooming. 15 In the 1988 general election, 91,602,291 Americans, or 50.16% of those eligible to vote, cast a ballot. 1 55 Utilizing these 152 Auerbach, supra note 9, at 70 (quoting J. HURST, JUSTICE HOLMES ON LE-GAL HISTORY 29 (1964) figures, a series of mathematical calculations finds that between 40-43% of all eligible Americans were not registered to vote on election day., 5 , In absolute terms as well, the numbers are striking-roughly seventyfive million Americans were not registered to vote on election day. 157 If one presumes that the turnout rate will continue to fall, as it has done precipitously since 1960,158 it is logical to presume further that there will be a corresponding decline in the registration rate. This downward spiral of registration could ultimately provoke a situation in which more than fifty percent of eligible American voters are not registered to vote, or in which more Americans were not registered than voted in a presidential election.
This spiral is especially extreme in its impact upon minorities, the young, and the urban poor. 5 As the United States Commission on Civil Rights noted in 1981, "given the depressed economic status of many minority communities, restrictive registration practices are espe-158 These findings are based upon a number of basic cross-multiplication calculations. 91,602,291 Americans voted in 1988, representing 50.16% of the eligible populace. See id. In the "percentage fraction" then, 50.16% would be the numerator (the percentage of citizens who actually voted in the 1988 election) and 100% would be the denominator (the percentage of citizens eligible to vote in the 1988 election). This fractional equation would be equal to the "real number fraction," which would have 91,602,291 as the numerator (the number of citizens who actually voted in the 1988 election) and the unknown number of citizens eligible to vote in the 1988 election as the denominator. By multiplying the numerator of the "real number fraction" (91, 602, 291) with the denominator of the "percentage fraction" (100%), and then dividing the result by the numerator of the "percentage fraction" (50.16%), one would find a "real number fraction" denominator of 182,620,197- cially burdensome." ' Voter participation has always been strongly related with socioeconomic factors, especially education and income; as a result, minority groups and the poor have experienced lower rates of participation. 1 ' This problem is exacerbated by a younger population, notorious for their low levels of participation, in urban minority communities." 6 2 Thus, minorities and the poor, who have in effect have "the largest stake in social change," remain disproportionately disconnected from the political process. 6 ' The inherent defects in American registration laws have culminated in a "critical point" for these groups," 6 in which the right to vote often is no longer a fundamental right of citizenship.
B. Legislative Self-Interest in Resisting Registration Reform
Political realities also dictate that judicial action be taken in the realm of registration. Many legislators at both the federal and state level have derived their power from existing levels of citizen participation, and may be loathe to change the status quo and thereby threaten their political future.' 6 5 As one set of commentators has noted:
Both Congress and the state legislatures -and, in fact, most practicing politicians -fear the impact of drastic registration changes that would redefine the electorate by substantially increasing its numbers. Politicians are content to maintain an electorate they understand and with which they have had success. Self-interest favors retention of the familiar and
Guinier specifically has noted that registration requirements discriminate, as "private resources such as cars and telephones, which are critical to functioning in this two-step process, are unavailable to poor people, especially racial and language minorities." Guinier, supra note 24, at 419. 161 See, e.g., W. CROTTY, supra note 36, at 53 (noting that "[tihe young, blacks, the least educated, the unemployed, blue collar workers . . . are the people least likely to be part of the electorate"); P. KIMBALL, supra note 18, at 16-17 ("Voter participation has always exhibited a high correlation with education and income, two spheres of urban disadvantage."). 162 See P. KIMBALL, supra note 18, at 16-17. 163 Id. at 289; see Crotty, supra note 11, at 77-78 (noting that "those left out of the active electorate are the ones least able to afford it").
16
REPORT: AFTER THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, supra note 79, at 6. 166 See Crotty, Introduction: Political Reform One reason for the resistance to registration reform has been opposition by Republican and southern Democratic legislators who fear an increase in the "liberal" electorate.1 67 Most social scientists believe, however, that the increase in participation through registration reform would generally be insensitive to partisan dynamics.1 the bills are "incrementalist" reforms, representing modest plans aimed at requiring or persuading states to incorporate changes into electoral procedures in order to increase registration, while others are "bigbang" proposals, aimed at fundamentally altering traditional registration practices. 1 7 0 It is likely, however, based upon the fate of similar bills, that to the extent these proposals contemplate significant reform of the registration process consistent with universal enrollment, none will be passed, let alone reach the House or Senate floor. Congress recently has rejected or failed to act upon numerous bills that have attempted to remedy defects in the system of personal registration. We have recognized that, 'as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.' To achieve these necessary objectives, States have enacted comprehensive and sometimes complex election codes. Each provision of these schemes, whether it governs the registration and qualifications of voters . . . inevitably affects-at least to some degree-the individual's right to vote and his right to associate with others for political ends. Nevertheless, the State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions. 8 The Court thus found in Anderson that some voting restrictions that 178 Article I, Section 2 reads: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous burden the right to vote are not subject to strict scrutiny, noting instead that courts should balance the "character and magnitude of the asserted injury" with the "precise interests" put forth by the states to justify the restriction.' 5 Lower courts similarly have been loathe to apply strict scrutiny when registration laws are challenged absent an absolute deprivation of the right to vote. Indeed, in Coalition for Sensible & Humane Solutions v. Wamser, ' 8 " a district court held that absent absolute preclusion from voting, the applicable standard of review for registration restrictions was rationality.' 8 7 Applying that standard, the court found that St. Louis's refusal to deputize volunteers as voter registrars was rationally related to the city's interest in preventing fraud and maintaining impartiality.' 8 8
Several credible arguments have been put forth, however, that demonstrate that contemporary registration laws could be subject to successful constitutional challenges.' 89 Such a legal challenge to registration laws could serve as the underlying basis for judicial intervention in the voter registration realm. In the case of redistricting, it was an equal protection challenge to Tennessee's districting laws in Baker v. Carr' 90 that opened the door for the Court's mandating of the rule of one person, one vote. A constitutional challenge to registration laws could serve much the same purpose.
One set of promising constitutional challenges' 9 ' is premised upon the fundamental right to vote. 19 2 It would argue that registration restrictions violate the equal protection clause by not being a sufficient "compelling state interest" nor the "least restrictive means" of achieving such an interest. 193 In terms of the former, the limits on the hours and locations of registration sites based upon an economic rationale could be challenged 4s an insufficient justification when the opportunity for citizens to register is thereby impeded."" It also could be argued that though the prevention of vote fraud is a compelling state interest, most states do not utilize pre-election day fraud detection methods that would justify the resulting hindrance on registration. 9 5 Finally, it could be demonstrated that there are alternative methods of registration that prevent vote fraud yet are "less restrictive" in the burden that is placed on the potential registrant. 1 9 These are among the myriad of potential constitutional arguments that could serve as the linchpin for judicial intervention in the voter registrationorealm.
B. Remedy of Governmental Voter Enrollment
In order to remedy satisfactorily the "critical features" that characterize the system of personal registration in the United States, 1 97 as well as satisfy the equal protection provisions that these laws violate, the Court will be compelled to mandate uniform voter enrollment by the government. In other words, the Court must transfer the onus of registration from the individual to the state.
In the case of redistricting, a clear result of the rule of one person, one vote was that it served to remedy the "critical features" that char-acterized malapportionment in the United States."' In implicitly requiring states to redistrict every ten years, 199 the Court both erased the problem of legislative self-interest in resisting reform and guaranteed that the requirement of mathematical equality would be combined with an automatic, decennial adjustment process. 200 Any other remedy which did not require an automatic adjustment process would have only temporarily remedied the "critical features"; malapportionment would have grown again and legislators would have remained loathe to reform districting laws.
In the realm of voter registration, the only judicial mandate that would remedy the inherent "critical features" would be a requirement that the government undertake the responsibility of uniform voter enrollment at regular intervals. "Incrementalist" remedies 0 ' "depend on the good will and self-motivation of the state or other electoral unit. . . . [w] ith no pressure [to act affirmatively,] . . .reform is unlikely." 20 2 From their disenfranchising origins 0 2 to their present status, 0 4 registration laws increasingly serve to restrict qualified citizens from the ballot; piecemeal reforms aimed at encouraging citizens to register cannot overcome these historical burdens. Studies have demonstrated that registration drives generally are ineffective at curbing the downward spiral of registration, 20 5 and there is evidence that even in the one state that does not require registration, North Dakota, 0 the historical impact of registration laws impedes many citizens from the ballot. 20 ' Any remedy that retains the present situation in which the burden of registration is placed upon the individual cannot ensure the downward spiral of registration rates will cease.
The Court thus will be compelled to mandate that the state undertake uniform voter enrollment at regular intervals. While there are a number of "big-bang" proposals 208 for registration reform that already have been put forth, 20 9 it would be for the states to develop and implement programs that comport with the new constitutional mandate.
CONCLUSION
Registration laws in the United States have had an inherent and continuing disenfranchising effect. The resulting impediment to the ballot for millions of qualified citizens threatens the very legitimacy of democratic government. 2 " As one commentator has noted, "[d]emocracy must be its own teacher. Those whose lives are untouched by any sort of involvement have no framework of experience within which to develop the patience and appreciation for the complexities or tradeoffs of evolutionary progress. ' This Comment has argued that the increasingly worsening condition of the system of voter registration will, absent imminent legislative reform, compel judicial intention similar to the affirmative action taken by the Court when confronted with gross malapportionment. Faced with the presence of downwardly spiralling registration rates and legislative self-interest in resisting registration reform, the Court will be forced to require the states to undertake the responsibility of the uniform enrollment of citizens at regular intervals. This constitutional mandate will not by itself induce a turnout in the United States comparable to those of other western nations, nor serve as a panacea for the apathy and alienation that many citizens feel from the political process. It will ensure, however, that the fundamental right to vote will no longer be predicated upon obscure, complex, and historically disenfranchising registration procedures. One commentator has noted that "[t]he more representative [government] is of the concerns of its electors, the greater its vitality and the better the long-run prognosis for its continued health. ' 21 2 Judicial intervention in the realm of voter registration will help to guarantee that the United States will fulfill this mandate into the twenty-first century. 209 See, e.g., Crotty, supra note 11, at 102-06 (reviewing such registration reform proposals). 210 See sources cited supra note 177.
p. KIMBALL, supra note 18, at 290. 212 Crotty, supra note 11, at 89.
